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STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS IN THE
INTERPRETATION
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Julian G. Ku*
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of customary international law' ("CIL") by courts
in the United States, long the subject of debate among schol-
ars,2 has finally come to the attention of the Supreme Court.
In the last few years, the Court has interpreted and applied
CIL in at least three different ways.
First, the Court has recently cited a number of interna-
tional precedents to interpret provisions of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. For instance, the Court recently cited the CIL of human
rights to find that the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed before the age of eighteen is unconstitu-
tional.3 Second, the Court has used the CIL to interpret stat-
"Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. The author pre-
sented a version of this paper at a symposium on International Law in the
United States Legal System: Observance, Application, and Enforcement held by
the Santa Clara Law Review on January 28, 2005.
1. There are two main types of international law, treaties, and customary
law. Unlike treaties, which are agreements between nation-states, customary
international law "results from a general and consistent practice of states fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
2. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense
About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 393 (1997).
3. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). The Court also cited CIL in
its decision to find Texas's laws prohibiting sodomy unconstitutional. See Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (citing P. G. & J. H. v. United King-
dom, App. No. 00044787/98, P 56 Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001; Modinos v. Cy-
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utes and treaties. For example, the Court cited CIL of war to
interpret the September 11th Resolution 4 as authorizing the
detention of enemy combatants in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.! Fi-
nally, the Court has used CIL as a substantive rule of deci-
sion. This has occurred most recently in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain6 where the Court interpreted CIL as part of the
common law cognizable in federal courts pursuant to the
Alien Tort Statute7 to reject a plaintiffs claim for damages
due to his detention by a Mexican citizen and U.S. drug en-
forcement agents.8
For many commentators, it is entirely appropriate for the
Court to independently interpret and apply CIL in all of these
contexts. Indeed, a number of scholars have actively encour-
aged the Court, and federal courts in general, to do so.9 These
scholars have identified a number of reasons why such use of
CIL in these different contexts is historically grounded, for-
mally authorized, and in some cases, functionally useful as a
mechanism for supporting the overall development of CIL."
While garnering many accolades, the use of CIL by the
Court has drawn criticism as well." With respect to the use
of CIL for constitutional interpretation, members of the
House of Representatives have proposed a resolution decrying
such usage. 2  Additionally, scholars have criticized the
prus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R., Apr. 22, 1993; Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R., Oct.
26, 1988).
4. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001).
5. 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (citing Geneva Conventions and documents
describing customary law of war).
6. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
8. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764.
9. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary
Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 461 (1989); Harold Hongju
Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991). See also
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990).
10. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 509 n.17 (2d ed. 1996) (citing CIL as common law); JORDAN J.
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6, 95, 338-45
(1996) (arguing that some customary international law rules supersede even
later federal legislation); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984) (arguing that CIL should have status as
federal law).
11. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004).
12. Tom Curry, A Flap over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, House
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Court's endorsement of CIL as a substantive rule of decision
in lawsuits brought under the Alien Tort Statute.
13
The purpose in this essay is not to recapitulate these dis-
agreements, but instead, to identify a different problem with
the interpretive and substantive use of CIL by federal and
state courts. Whether a court uses CIL as a tool for statutory
or constitutional interpretation or as a substantive rule of de-
cision, the court's usage creates potentially serious structural
conflicts in the U.S. constitutional system.
Part I begins with an explanation of this structural con-
flict by briefly reviewing the debates over the constitutional
allocation of control over customary international law in the
U.S. domestic system. Analysis of the text of the U.S. Consti-
tution, past practice, and existing doctrine does not defini-
tively resolve the status of whether federal courts have the fi-
nal authority to interpret and whether those interpretations
also bind the executive branch. Indeed, there are strong ar-
guments suggesting that as a matter of the original under-
standing of the Constitution and as historical practice, the
executive branch holds the dominant role in the interpreta-
tion, application, and execution of CIL obligations on behalf of
the United States.
Part II explores some of the consequences of federal
courts' usage of CIL. If the Executive does hold a central, if
not dominant, role in the interpretation and application of
CIL, then any judicial use of CIL may create structural con-
flict with the executive branch's use of CIL as part of its con-
duct of foreign policy. Part III concludes that courts can
avoid structural conflicts by adopting rules limiting their us-
age of CIL. The proposed rules, similar in form but stricter in
effect than the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in
Sosa,4 should, in most cases, result in the avoidance of this
structural conflict.
To be sure, the examples of structural conflict that I iden-
tify are not always severe and some are unlikely to lead to
any serious structural crisis. Even if such structural conflicts
are rare, they still may occur, and, at the very least, courts
Members Protest Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in Big Cases, MSNBC, at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232 (Mar. 11, 2004).
13. Julian G. Ku & John C. Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2004).
14. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2739.
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and commentators must recognize and address the likelihood
of such conflicts in order to credibly defend the continued us-
age of CIL by federal and state courts.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OVER INTERPRETATION OF
CIL
Although the Supreme Court has recently indicated that
CIL should be considered a type of federal law, 5 it is still un-
clear which branch of the federal government holds the au-
thority to issue binding interpretations of CIL. For a variety
of reasons, the president has emerged as the branch of gov-
ernment most responsible for the interpretation and applica-
tion of CIL on behalf of the United States.
A. CIL and the Constitution
The only mention of CIL in the text of the Constitution
occurs in Art. I, section eight, where Congress is assigned the
power to "define and punish... Offences against the Laws of
Nations."'6  This under-used and understudied provision
might give Congress the exclusive power to interpret or rec-
ognize CIL. 7 But, neither historical materials nor judicial in-
terpretation of this provision has supported this reading.
Rather, the majority view of courts and commentators is
that even if Congress has not codified CIL as federal statu-
tory law, CIL is still cognizable by federal courts as part of
the common law. This view, best reflected in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 8 holds that CIL should be
understood as incorporated into the phrase "Laws of the
United States" in Articles III and VI of the Constitution. As
such, claims of violations of CIL would properly fall within
the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction under Article
III" and would also preempt inconsistent state law under Ar-
ticle V. 2O
15. See, e.g., id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
17. The lone recent study of the clause can be found in Beth Stephens, Fed-
eralism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish . . .Of-
fenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000).
18. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 111. The Restatement is published by
the American Law Institute and is generally accepted to reflect the views of
leading scholars and practitioners on important areas of law.
19. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. Although no court has preempted state law using CIL, there is some
860 Vol: 45
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But while there is scholarship supporting this view,2' it is
far from conclusive, certainly as a matter of historical evi-
dence and judicial precedent. As noted in a series of articles,
the incorporation of CIL as federal law is unsupported by any
judicial precedent, nor is it required by any convincing evi-
dence of the original intent of the drafters of the Constitu-
tion.22 Indeed, early historical documents and subsequent ju-
dicial precedent actually support the view that CIL forms
part of the general common law that was not exclusive to ei-
ther federal or state courts.23
Thus, as a historical matter, whether or not Congress
chose to codify CIL as federal statutory law, federal and state
courts have applied CIL as part of their interpretation of the
general common law. This body of law was applicable in both
federal and state courts, but it constituted neither federal nor
state law. The "CIL as common law" understanding is fur-
ther strengthened by judicial precedent. In particular, a
number of Supreme Court decisions held that the Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction limiting appeals to questions of federal
law did not extend to appeals based on CIL because CIL did
not constitute federal law. 4 The Supreme Court's decision in
Sosa to uphold lawsuits claiming violations of CIL under the
Alien Tort Statute partially settled this debate over the
status of CIL.u Although the Court did not explicitly address
the status of CIL, it appeared to assume that CIL could be, in
limited circumstances, cognizable in federal courts, even in
academic support for this view. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 111, reporters'
note 3.
21. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10.
22. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 2; Arthur M. Weisburd, State
Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 38-44
(1995).
23. 1 have discussed the "CIL as general common law" view extensively in
Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
265, 271-91 (2002). This question has been the subject of substantial commen-
tary elsewhere as well, and despite some aggressive claims by scholars such as
Professor Paust, as in Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Hu-
man Rights Treaties Are the Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301,
301 n.4 (1999), most other scholars have conceded that that CIL was understood
as a form of general common law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 1; Neu-
man, supra note 2, at 373; Stephens, supra note 2, at 400-01 & n.34.
24. See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 266
U.S. 580 (1924); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1876).
25. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2764 (2004).
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cases where diversity of citizenship did not exist.26  While
thus endorsing CIL as a form of federal law, the Court did not
elaborate on either the textual or precedential basis for this
holding. It also refused to extend its holding to allow plain-
tiffs to invoke CIL as the basis for federal question jurisdic-
tion, thus appearing to keep CIL as a unique form of federal
law that can only be invoked pursuant to the Alien Tort Stat-
ute and in no other context. 7
B. CIL and the Executive Branch
Despite the attention paid to judicial determinations of
the status of CIL, culminating in the Supreme Court's appar-
ent endorsement of CIL as federal law last Term,28 neither
federal nor state courts have been the primary expositors of
CIL in the U.S. system.
Rather, for a variety of reasons, the executive branch has
emerged as the institution most responsible for administer-
ing, interpreting, and applying CIL. This power may flow
from the Constitution's vesting of the "executive power" in the
President in Article II of the Constitution or it may flow from
the president's general responsibility to conduct foreign af-
fairs." Because CIL is traditionally determined by state prac-
tice and administering foreign policy entails the president's
administration of state practice, the president is usually re-
sponsible for the interpretation, application, and recognition
of CIL on behalf of the United States.
For example, in 1948, President Harry Truman unilater-
ally declared, by executive order, that the United States
claimed rights to the undersea continental shelf pursuant to
the customary law of the sea.3° This order extended U.S.
26. Id. at 2765 n.19.
27. Id. ("[W]e know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction
was extended [to other CIL] subject to any comparable congressional assump-
tion.").
28. See id.
29. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001), for the most powerful statement
of the view that the president controls all foreign affairs matters not specifically
allocated to Congress due to the Constitution's allocation of "executive power" to
the president in Article II. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Execu-
tive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004), for a
critique of the historical foundations of this view.
30. See Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of
the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No.
862 Vol: 45
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claims over thousands of square miles of undersea territory
and arguably modified the existing CIL of the sea.3 Yet, the
president's power to issue such a declaration accepting CIL
rules on behalf of the United States has never been seriously
questioned by any court. President Ronald Reagan made a
similar declaration in 1983 when he accepted, on behalf of the
United States, most (but not all) of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Treaty rules as CIL binding on the United States.32
In some cases, domestic courts have treated the presi-
dent's views as binding. For instance, great weight, if not ab-
solute deference, has been given by both federal and state
courts with regard to the executive's views of the proper ap-
plication of the law of foreign sovereign immunity.3 This was
especially the case prior to Congress's codification (pursuant
in part to its "Define and Punish" powers) of the law of for-
eign sovereign immunity in 1975, 4 and it continues to be the
case in those areas that Congress failed to codify. 5
The domestic effect of the president's views of CIL is also
buttressed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ameri-
can Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi36 to allow statements of na-
tional executive policy to preempt inconsistent state laws. 7
While that decision did not involve a question of CIL, its
broad recognition of the president's power to preempt state
law by setting a national policy could easily be understood to
include the power to declare adherence to international law.
Indeed, the executive branch is currently attempting to use
this foreign policy power to preempt state law inconsistent
with a recent judgment of the International Court of Justice.'
2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
31. See id.
32. See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983).
33. See, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); F.W. Stone Eng'g Co. v.
Petroleous Mexicanos, 42 A.2d 57, 59-60 (Pa. 1945).
34. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting sovereign immunity for Panamanian leader on grounds that Execu-
tive Branch "has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied
head-of-state immunity").
36. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
37. Id. at 425 (finding California law preempted by "express federal pol-
icy.").
38. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 52, Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-20687),
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/medellin.sg.brief.pdf.
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If this exercise of the foreign policy preemption power is up-
held, the president could similarly claim a power to preempt
state law inconsistent with a rule of CIL that the president
has adhered to on behalf of the United States.
The executive's central role in the administration of CIL
has led scholars to speculate and debate whether the Execu-
tive is "bound" by CIL under his duties to "take care" that the
laws be faithfully executed.39 The leading case on the subject,
The Paquete Habana,° appears to contemplate a power by the
executive to issue "controlling executive acts" that would
override a court's application of CIL.4' This opinion has been
read to suggest that although the executive might be bound
as a matter of international law, no domestic court has the
authority to require the executive to comply with a CIL rule.
Although recent scholarship has contested this reading of the
case,42 the executive branch seems to have adopted this view.43
Moreover, no court since The Paquete Habana has addressed
this issue.
In sum, historical practice and judicial doctrine strongly
suggest that regardless of the status of CIL as domestic law,
the president is the chief administrator of CIL on behalf of
the United States. Absent congressional intervention, the
president holds the power to accept or reject CIL rules on be-
half of the United States and to make his interpretations
binding on federal and state courts.
III. REVEALING THE STRUCTURAL CONFLICT
A closer look at the timely but highly controversial U.S.
interpretations of the CIL of war in the context of its ongoing
war on terrorism reveals the ways that the judicial use of CIL
can create structural conflicts between the judicial and execu-
tive branches.
39. See Arthur M. Weishurd, The Executive Branch and International Law,
41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1239-40 (1988).
40. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
41. Id. at 700.
42. Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Cus-
tomary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
321 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override
Customary or Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law
Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 163, 170-71 (1989) (discuss-
ing whether Congress and the executive can override CIL).
Vol: 45864
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A. CIL as Common Law
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
U.S. executive branch has made a number of determinations
about the applicability of CIL. For example, President
George W. Bush concluded that the customary international
law of war does not require the United States to treat cap-
tured fighters, whom it accuses of being terrorists, with the
same protections that it would give so-called "lawful combat-
ants."" Additionally, the military is now charging various de-
tainees with committing violations of the CIL of war, includ-
ing the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts that
violate the CIL of war.45 The executive branch has further
concluded that the CIL of human rights law does not prevent
it from removing foreign citizens from Iraq as part of the con-
troversial practice of renditions.46 In all cases, the U.S. gov-
ernment claims to be interpreting what CIL requires (e.g.
that combatants avoid targeting civilians and engaging in
terrorist acts) and what CIL does not require (e.g. treating
such "terrorist" combatants as prisoners of war).
These determinations about the applicability of CIL are
highly controversial. Although most of the criticism focuses
on the administration's interpretations of its treaty obliga-
tions,47 lawsuits challenging the Administration's policies un-
der the Alien Tort Statute have alleged that the U.S. govern-
44. See President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treat-
ment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http'//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html [hereinaf-
ter Military Order]. For a discussion of the international law determinations in
this order, see James C. Ho & John C. Yoo, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 207 (2003).
45. The propriety of such charges is being challenged in a current appeal in
the D.C. Circuit. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Allison Danner & Jenny
S. Martinez, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 04-5393), avail-
able at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/dannermartinezamicus.
pdf (last visited July 30, 2005) (arguing that law of conspiracy does not apply to
law of war).
46. See Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A57363-20040ct23?language=printer (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
47. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Ge-
neva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (arguing that the president is
bound by treaties codifying the law of war).
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ment itself has been violating the CIL of war." Because the
U.S. government claims that it is not violating CIL, these
lawsuits are based on the theory that the U.S. government's
interpretation of CIL was mistaken or incorrect. 9
For instance, numerous lawsuits filed under the Alien
Tort Statute allege that the United States has violated CIL in
detaining suspected or alleged collaborators of Al Qaeda in
Guantanamo Bay. In Rasul v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiffs, for-
mer detainees at Guantanamo Bay, allege that they were
subjected to prolonged arbitrary detentions in violation of the
law of nations."
The executive branch disagrees that these detentions
constitute a violation of the CIL prohibition on arbitrary de-
tention. Indeed, as the administration argued in its briefing
in Sosa,51 there is no such CIL prohibition on arbitrary deten-
tion where federal law authorizes such detentions.52
Thus, a trial court attempting to discern the proper in-
terpretation of CIL must choose between the plaintiffs' and
the executive branch's view of CIL. Although there may be
strong arguments that, as a matter of international law, the
plaintiffs' view is the correct one, this does not change the fact
that such a determination would create a structural conflict
between the executive branch and the judicial branch.
B. CIL as Statutory and Treaty Interpretation
Courts not only consider CIL in the context of alien tort
lawsuits, but they also use it as a tool of statutory and treaty
interpretation. In the statutory context, courts in the United
States adhere to The Charming Betsy doctrine, which in-
structs them to avoid interpreting acts of Congress when it
will violate CIL.53 In the treaty context, courts use CIL either
48. See, e.g., Rasul v. Rumsfeld (complaint available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/september llthsept lArticle.asp?ObjD=1VSkOOGX7D&Conte
nt=455) (last visited Aug. 22, 2005).
49. Ex-Guantanamo Inmates File Suit, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2004, at A10,
2004 WLNR 5398491. See Terri Somers, Lawsuit Ties Titan to Abuse at Iraq
Prison, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 2, 2004, at C1.
50. Complaint, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legalseptember lith/docs/Rasulv.RumsfeldComplaintOctober_26o
ctfinal.pdf (last visited July 30, 2005).
51. Brief of the United States in Support of Petition, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2003 U.S. Briefs 485.
52. See id.
53. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
866 Vol: 45
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to fill gaps in treaty language or to adopt rules of treaty con-
struction.
For instance, in Sosa, the Court was asked to interpret
whether a federal statute54 authorized the arrest of the plain-
tiff in Mexico. The plaintiff urged the Court to construe the
statute to avoid violating CIL prohibiting extraterritorial ar-
rests under The Charming Betsy doctrine. The government
urged that the statute be read to authorize such an arrest,
especially where any norm of customary international law
that existed was "ill defined."5 The Sosa Court did not ad-
dress this issue because it disposed of the suit on other
grounds.56 But the issue highlights the structural conflict be-
tween the Court's interpretation and the executive's interpre-
tation of whether a rule of CIL exists. The Sosa Court wisely
avoided this issue.
Courts have also used CIL as an aid in the interpretation
of treaties in the context of suits challenging treatment of
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay." Courts have interpreted the
Geneva Conventions such that they either avoid conflict with
or incorporate emerging principles of CIL. Courts have held
that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions em-
bodies "international humanitarian norms"58 and sets forth
the "most fundamental requirements of the law of war."59
Such requirements under CIL include "not only acts such as
torture and intentionally causing great suffering or inflicting
serious injury to body, mind or health but also extends to
other acts contravening the fundamental principle of humane
treatment, in particular those which constitute an attack on
For a general discussion of the doctrine, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming
Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretative Role of
International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2000).
55. Brief of the United States in Support of Petition, supra note 50.
56. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2768 n.26 ("We have no occa-
sion to decide whether Alvarez is right that 21 U.S.C. § 878 did not authorize
the arrest.").
57. A number of such suits have been filed. The two most prominent cases
have been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480-82 (D.D.C. 2005) (ruling
that detainees had rights under constitution and treaty but not customary in-
ternational law); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding
detainees have neither constitutional, nor treaty, nor CIL rights cognizable in
federal court).
58. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
59. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
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human dignity."' The court further held that this includes
injury to "mental health" and "includes those acts which do
not fulfill the conditions set for the characterization of torture
,,61 Thus, by interpreting CIL as part of a treaty obliga-
tion, the court's interpretation of CIL (as opposed to the pro-
visions of the treaty itself) may conflict with the executive's
view of what CIL requires.
Even if the executive is not "bound" as a matter of domes-
tic law, it is still limited in its ability to set U.S. policy toward
a particular rule of CIL by the court's citation of CIL in the
same area. For example, a U.S. soldier or a U.S. government
official appearing in a foreign or international court might not
be able to argue that the United States does not accept a rule
of CIL if judicial decisions from the United States have recog-
nized and cited that rule of CIL. In this way, the president's
traditional and constitutionally allocated power to control
CIL is challenged by judicial interpretations.
C. CIL and Constitutional Interpretation
The area where a structural conflict seems least serious
is, paradoxically, where it might occur most frequently. In
the past three years the Supreme Court has begun to regu-
larly cite foreign and customary international law in order to
interpret provisions of the U.S. Constitution. This practice
has been controversial among some of the Court's own mem-
bers as well as in Congress. The actual significance of this
practice, however, remains uncertain.
In Roper v. Simmons,62 the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of individuals for
crimes committed before the age of eighteen. To buttress its
holding that such executions would violate evolving standards
of decency incorporated by the Eighth Amendment, the Court
cited several international law sources as evidence that world
opinion found such executions unacceptable.63  The Court
60. Mehinovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1352 (quoting Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case
No. IT-95-14, Judgment (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 3, 2000) 155, 2004 WL
34467832).
61. Id. 156.
62. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment proscribes execution of individuals who
are mentally retarded).
63. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-99.
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cited a number of treaties that the United States had either
failed to ratify or ratified subject to reservations with respect
to the death penalty, 4 judicial opinions of international and
foreign tribunals rejecting such executions, and treaties that
the United States was not even asked to sign. Because none
of the international legal sources cited by the Court formally
binds the U.S. government as a treaty obligation, the Court
was implicitly recognizing a norm of CIL proscribing such
executions.
The Court has also used CIL prohibitions against arbi-
trary detention to interpret whether individuals detained by
the U.S. military as "enemy combatants" in its war on terror-
ism have due process protection.65 In response to the U.S.
government's claim that due process protections do not apply
to unlawful enemy combatants, human rights advocates ar-
gued that CIL prohibitions on arbitrary detention require the
U.S. government to provide due process protections under the
Fifth Amendment.66 The Court in Hamdi did not endorse this
analysis. Indeed, the plurality opinion appeared to suggest
that due process protections could be more narrowly inter-
preted to conform to the right of nations to detain enemy
combatants as reflected in the CIL of war.67 As Justice
O'Connor explained, "the law of war and the realities of com-
bat may render such detentions both necessary and appropri-
ate, and our due process analysis need not blink at those re-
alities." 8
Though the Court avoided the conflict here, the invoca-
tion of CIL of human rights and war in the context of the in-
terpretation of the Fifth Amendment demonstrates how CIL
64. See id. (citing Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art.
37, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (United Nations); American Convention on Human Rights
"Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 146 (Or-
ganizacion de los Estados Americanos); African Charter on the Rights and Wel-
fare of the Child, Nov. 29, 1999, art. 5(3), httpJ/www.logos-
net.net/ilo/150_base/en/instr/afri_3.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005) (Organiza-
tion of African Unity)).
65. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004).
66. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights in Support of Petitioners at
10-11, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004) (No. 03-6696) ("Neither
the ICCPR nor customary international law creates an exception from this pro-
hibition on arbitrary detention for the Executive's invented 'enemy combatant'
classification .... ).
67. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2647.
68. Id.
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can become intertwined with the process of constitutional in-
terpretation. Rather than decry this somewhat controversial
practice or opine on the merits of the Court's decision, the fo-
cus should be on a different consequence of the Court's invo-
cation of CIL.
Any recognition of a CIL principle, whether to limit or in-
crease constitutional protections, also constitutes judicial rec-
ognition of that principle as an accepted rule of CIL. In turn,
this comprises evidence that the United States has accepted,
through state practice, the proposed CIL rule. While such
rules may be salutary, the court's citation of such rules limits
the executive branch's ability to contest the rule either in do-
mestic litigation or in the implementation of its foreign policy.
It is arguable that CIL would have any significance as an
interpretive tool if the Supreme Court establishes essentially
the same requirements as a matter of constitutional law.
However, under existing doctrine, not all constitutional pro-
tections restrain U.S. government actions overseas, especially
against aliens.69 For this reason, a citation by a court that
something constitutes a rule of CIL might affect U.S. gov-
ernment officials or agents abroad in a way that a constitu-
tional rule does not.
It may be that courts, especially when interpreting the
Geneva Conventions, adopted a better accepted rule of CIL or
one that reflects better moral or policy considerations. Even
so, such interpretations run into longstanding judicial and
executive practice authorizing the executive branch to control
the interpretation of CIL. Thus, even if the courts would be
better at interpreting CIL, a proposition John Yoo and I dis-
pute elsewhere," their intervention here creates, at the very
least, the possibility of conflict with the executive branch's in-
terpretation of CIL as part of its constitutionally allocated
powers to conduct foreign policy. Judicial interpretation of
CIL does not always create this conflict, but it could create a
conflict and such a conflict could be serious.
69. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding
that Fourth Amendment restrictions do not limit action of government agents
acting against aliens outside U.S. territory).
70. See generally Ku & Yoo, supra note 13.
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IV. RULES FOR AVOIDING STRUCTURAL CONFLICTS
The existence of a structural conflict here remains mostly
speculative due to the Court's self-restraint. Notably, the
Court in Sosa and in Hamdi purposefully limited the use of
CIL by either restricting the ability of courts to recognize CIL
or by refusing invitations to use CIL to interpret statutes and
constitutional provisions. This restrained practice suggests
techniques that courts can use to minimize or limit the con-
flicts identified in Part II.
A. Absolute Deference to Executive Branch Interpretations of
CIL
One way courts could avoid most structural conflicts
would be to give the executive branch absolute deference in
its interpretations of CIL. Thus, to the extent courts do in-
terpret CIL, any such interpretation could not depart from
stated policies of the executive branch. Such absolute defer-
ence may seem unusual, but such absolute deference also
characterizes judicial application of the CIL of foreign sover-
eign immunity.'
To avoid strategic executive branch manipulation of CIL,
courts might require a formal declaration or "controlling ex-
ecutive act"7 2 before acquiescing to an executive branch de-
termination. The Court has debated what constitutes such a
controlling act in the context of executive acts that would pre-
empt state law,' 3 although members of the current Court ap-
pear to agree that the executive can make such controlling
executive acts. 4 Such "controlling executive acts" might take
the form of an executive order issued by the president himself
or a controlling legal opinion from a subordinate to which he
delegates this authority. 5 If such a controlling act is issued,
71. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
72. See The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903) (following international
law in absence of a "controlling executive act").
73. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423 n.13 and 441 n.5
(2003).
74. Compare id. at 423 n.13 (explaining that executive policy statements
should be given effect where there is no evidence of conflict within executive
branch), with id. at 441-42 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (explaining that more for-
mal executive statement is needed to preempt state law).
75. The "Tate Letter" is perhaps the most famous example of the type of
delegated legal opinion which courts have traditionally given absolute defer-
ence. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. State Department, 26
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the Court should defer to this view. Thus, if the president de-
termines that CIL does not require giving Prisoner-Of-War
status to non-uniformed combatants,"6 the court should give
absolute deference to this determination.
7
This proposed rule for executive deference is different
from that suggested by the Supreme Court in Sosa. While the
Court in Sosa suggested that executive branch views on the
effect of a particular lawsuit on foreign relations should be
given "serious weight,"78 this rule goes farther and would re-
quire absolute deference to controlling executive branch de-
terminations on the substantive content of CIL.79 Moreover,
unlike in Sosa, this rule would apply to judicial citations to
CIL even when CIL is merely used as a rule of statutory or
constitutional interpretation.
B. Avoid CIL Where Doubts Exist as to the Views of the
Executive Branch
As a prudential matter, courts should also avoid citing to
a rule of CIL if there is any doubt as to that rule's acceptance
by the executive branch. As explained above, 0 if a court rec-
ognizes a rule of CIL, either in an alien tort claim suit or as a
matter of interpretation, it may interfere with the executive
branch's ability to conduct foreign policy in some future in-
stance. For this reason, courts should limit their recognition
of CIL to rules endorsed not just as a matter of state practice,
but by practice of the United States, in the form of the execu-
tive branch. To the extent there is any doubt as to the execu-
tive branch's view, the court should err on the side of avoiding
even a citation to CIL.
DEP'T. ST. BULL. 984 (1952). Issued by the State Department's Acting Legal Ad-
viser, it set U.S. policy toward the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity and was
generally given effect by courts. Id. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President
of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971) (following Tate Letter).
76. See Military Order, supra note 44.
77. This does not mean, however, that a court might not reject the presi-
dent's position on the grounds that his view violates a statutory requirement, a
treaty obligation, or a constitutional right. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo De-
tainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (avoiding plaintiffs CIL claims
but ruling against government on treaty claims).
78. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004).
79. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (holding that once the state
department has ruled on a matter of customary international law, the judiciary
should not interfere).
80. See discussion supra Part II.
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This may seem draconian, but if one takes seriously the
notion that the executive branch has control over the inter-
pretation, application, and development of CIL, then judicial
determinations will undercut this control. While the Execu-
tive Branch might have the ability to override such a judicial
determination as a matter of domestic law, the real issue is
the international consequence of the judicial determination.
The executive branch's attempt to accept or reject a rule of
CIL in an international forum or court could be undercut by
inconsistent domestic judicial determinations. Again, while
this is not always a serious problem, it is a non-trivial conflict
that can be avoided by judicial prudence at home.
C. Cite Foreign Law instead of CIL
Courts utilizing CIL as a method of constitutional inter-
pretation could also limit their interpretations to foreign law
rather than customary international law. Foreign law, or the
domestic law of foreign countries, does not create the same
kind of structural conflict because the court's citation of for-
eign law does not recognize or otherwise buttress a rule of
CIL.
Under this view, for instance, a court could cite a rule of
English common law,8' or a decision of the Zimbabwe Su-
preme Court,82 without creating the potential structural con-
flict. In fact, the practice of citing foreign law in a variety of
circumstances is long standing and relatively uncontroversial.
While one might challenge its relevance or legitimacy as a
tool for constitutional interpretation, citing foreign law at
least avoids the structural difficulty identified above.
D. A Continuing Role for International Law
The main objection to this rather restrictive view of the
role of CIL in domestic courts is that it would essentially re-
move international law from the purview of domestic courts.
81. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger J., con-
curring) (citing Roman and English common law to justify view that Constitu-
tion did not protect homosexual sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
82. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting
from the denial of petition for certiorari) (citing decisions from foreign courts to
support view that long wait on death row might constitute violation of constitu-
tional rights).
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This is not necessarily true for at least two reasons. First,
none of the structural conflicts identified necessarily applies
to that other main form of international law: treaties. Trea-
ties, with the imprimatur of the Senate and textual recogni-
tion in the Supremacy Clause and Article III, have a much
greater claim to the status of federal law binding the execu-
tive branch.83 Moreover, treaties probably have the same
status in domestic law as federal statutory law.'4 While some
deference to the executive branch in the interpretation of
treaties is probably necessary, unlike CIL, courts are not re-
quired to give the executive branch absolute deference in the
interpretation or application of treaties.85 Indeed, it is not
surprising that courts have relied on treaties like the Geneva
Convention rather than CIL in cases where they have ruled
against executive policies in the conduct of the war on terror-
ism.86
The second reason is that even if CIL falls into disuse by
the courts, this does not mean that CIL no longer exists as a
part of domestic U.S. law. Congress still retains the power to
codify CIL under the "Define and Punish" Clause of the Con-
stitution. When Congress acts through this clause, as it has
most prominently done in the context of foreign sovereign
immunity," courts have the authority to interpret and de-
velop CIL within the statutory guidelines established by Con-
gress. Any complaints of structural conflict by the executive
have far less, and perhaps, no weight in this context.
V. CONCLUSION
It is increasingly commonplace for federal courts to con-
sider questions of CIL, either as a substantive rule for resolv-
ing a particular case, or as a tool for statutory or constitu-
83. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties."); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (listing treaties as one basis for federal court jurisdic-
tion); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (listing treaties as part of "the supreme Law of
the Land").
84. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last in Time
Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
85. But see John C. Yoo, Politics As Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 868-
70 (2001) (book review).
86. See, e.g., Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
88. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000).
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tional interpretation. The goal in this essay is not to attack
this trend, but simply to point out that this approach to CIL,
even merely as a tool of interpretation, poses potentially seri-
ous structural conflicts for our constitutional system. Schol-
ars who support the increased use of CIL in all these contexts
cannot simply ignore these conflicts, and they should turn
their attention toward developing rules or guidelines to avoid
such structural conflicts.

